Posted by Colombo Telegraph ⋅ November 3, 2011 ⋅ 25 Comments

By Colombo Telegraph

“Sampanthan provided a copy of the program signed by Fonseka to Ambassador, noting that we were one of a few foreign missions to receive a copy.” the US Ambassador to Colombo wrote to Washington.

Sampanthan hoped his announcement would not only galvanize Tamil to vote Fonseka but also would convince others that Fonseka had a real chance of winning.

A leaked US diplomatic cable recount details of a meeting the embassy had had with Tamil National Alliance Chairman R. Sampanthan and the political situation after Sampantha’s announcement to support General Fonseka in the presidential election 2010. The Colombo Telegraph found the cable from WikiLeaks database. The cable written on January 1, 2010, classified as “CONFIDENTIAL” by the US Ambassador to Colombo Patricia A. Butenis.

The Fonseka signed program was also an addendum dealing with broader constitutional questions and the political devolution of power. The addendum was signed by General Fonseka and leader of the UNF Ranil Wickremesinghe but not Sampanthan. The addendum promised genuine power-sharing on a basis acceptable to Sinhala, Tamil, Muslim, and Burger communities and noted that power-sharing would take place both at the center in the periphery. It noted that in the ‘North-East’ – – a term chosen to highlight the unification of the two regions, which have been de-linked under Rajapaksas – – local executive, legislative, and judicial bodies would share responsibilities with the center except in certain key areas, such as national defense, monetary policy, immigration, etc.

The US ambassador Patricia A. Butenis wrote “ we saw Sampanthan several times in the period leading up to and following his announcement of support for Fonseka and know that the decision weighed greatly upon him. The stakes are very high for the Tamil community, which had gained new-found clout in the split in the Sinhala vote between Rajapaksa and Fonseka but also has much to lose. Sampanthan told Ambassador he agonized over the decision but ultimately had to face squarely the fact that Rajapaksa had done nothing for Tamil beyond releasing IDPs.” “ Sampanthan also told us he hoped his announcement would not only galvanize Tamil to vote Fonseka but also would convince others that Fonseka had a real chance of winning. While we will not know until election day wheather these hopes will be realized, indications are that a Fonseka victory appears more possible each day” Ambassador Butenis further wrote.

Sampanthan told Ambassador he agonized over the decision but ultimately had to face squarely the fact that Rajapaksa had done nothing for Tamil

Formally announcing Tamil National Alliance support for common opposition candidate Fonseka Sampanthan said that the TNA had consulted both candidates over the last several weeks and found that Fonseka responded to their concerns better than President Rajapaksa. Sampanthan said Rajapaksa holding office for another term would be in the interest of neither the country as whole nor Tamil-speaking people in the north east and enumerated a list of concerns. These included the government’s failure to promote reconciliation or to find an acceptable political solution to the national question, delays, Sampanthan argued, undertaken purposefully to enable the Rajapaksa government to implement a ‘hidden’ agenda to marginalize Tamils. He also called Rajapaksa’s performance on human rights and humanitarian issues “dismal,” noting that extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances had been common, mandatory constitutional provisions had been violated, and the enforcement of law and order had “collapsed.” Thus, “the rule of law and good governance have reached the nadir.”

To read the full text of the Sampandan – Fonseka pact see the below cable;

VZCZCXRO5576OO RUEHAG RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSRDE RUEHLM # 0017/01 0110454 ZNY CCCCC ZZHO 110454Z JAN 10 ZDSFM AMEMBASSY COLOMBOTO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1092INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITYRUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY 2242RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 9264RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU PRIORITY 7519RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 5355RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 3677RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO PRIORITY 5280 RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 0141RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM PRIORITY 0811 RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 4402RUEHCG/AMCONSUL CHENNAI PRIORITY 9826 RUEHBI/AMCONSUL MUMBAI PRIORITY 7115RUEHON/AMCONSUL TORONTO PRIORITY 0136 RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITYRUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 3978 RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITYRUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITYRUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITYC O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 COLOMBO 000017 C O R R E C T E D COPY – ADDED PASSING INSTRUCTIONS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INSB RELEASABLE TO: UK, CANADA, AUSTRALIA, SWITZERLAND E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/08/2020TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF PHUM PTER EAID MOPS CESUBJECT: FATEFUL STEP: MAIN TAMIL PARTY ANNOUNCES SUPPORTFOR FONSEKA COLOMBO 00000017 001.4 OF 005 Classified By: AMBASSADOR PATRICIA A. BUTENIS. REASONS: 1.4 (B, D) ¶1. (C) On January 6, leader of the Tamil National Alliance(TNA) R. Sampanthan formally announced the TNA’s supportfor common opposition candidate General Fonseka.Addressing a packed news conference at parliament,Sampanthan said the TNA had consulted both candidates overthe last several weeks and had found that Fonseka respondedto their concerns better than President Rajapaksa. Sampanthan said that Rajapaksa holding office for anotherterm would be in the interests of neither the country as awhole nor the Tamil-speaking people in the north and eastand enumerated a list of concerns. These included thegovernment’s failure to promote reconciliation or to findan acceptable political solution to the national question,delays, Sampanthan argued, undertaken purposefully to enable the Rajapaksa government to implement a "hiddenagenda" to marginalize Tamils. He also called Rajapaksa’sperformance on human rights and humanitarian issues"dismal," noting that extra-judicial killings and enforceddisappearances had been common, mandatory constitutionalprovisions had been violated, and the enforcement of lawand order had "collapsed." Thus, "the rule of law and good governance have reached the nadir." ¶2. (C) Sampanthan said little about General Fonseka and the opposition in his public statement other than to confirmthat the TNA had found their positions on issues related tothe Tamil community much better than Rajapaksa’s and thatthe TNA would support the general. Thegovernment-controlled press the next day was scathing incriticizing the TNA announcement as "another sell-out" andin accusing the TNA of having arrived at a secret deal withFonseka and the "LTTE diaspora" that would undermine thegains of the war victory. Sampanthan denied any secretdeal was made, but Fonseka did formulate a "Programme ofImmediate Relief Measures for War Affected Persons andAreas or Peace," outlining his plans for the north andeast, which undoubtedly helped solidify the TNA’s backing.(NOTE: Sampanthan provided a copy of the program signed byFonseka to Ambassador, noting that we were one of a fewforeign missions to receive a copy. The full text of theprogram is provided below in paragraph 5. END NOTE.) The program includes such measures as de-militarization, decentralization of political authority, re-settlement andrehabilitation of all IDPs, demining, restoration ofprivate land holdings, payment of compensation to those wholost property, restoration of transport services, reliefpackages, general amnesty and rehabilitation of formerfighters, and termination of the state of emergency. Therewas no mention in the program of accountability for warcrimes. ¶3. (C) Attached to the program was also an addendum dealingwith broader constitutional questions and the politicaldevolution of power (see paragraph 6 below for fulltext.). The addendum was signed by General Fonseka andleader of the United National Front Ranil Wickremesinghebut not Sampanthan. The addendum promised genuinepower-sharing on a basis acceptable to the Sinhala, Tamil,Muslim, and Burgher communities and noted thatpower-sharing would take place both at the center and inthe periphery. It noted that in the "North-East" — a termchosen to highlight the unification of the two regions,which have been de-linked under the Rajapaksas — localexecutive, legislative, and judicial bodies would shareresponsibilities with the center except in certain keyareas, such as national defense, monetary policy,immigration, etc. COLOMBO 00000017 002.4 OF 005 COMMENT——- ¶4. (C) We saw Sampanthan several times in the periodleading up to and following his announcement of support forFonseka and know that the decision weighed greatly uponhim. The stakes are very high for the Tamil community,which has gained new-found clout in the split in theSinhala vote between Rajapaksa and Fonseka but also hasmuch to lose. Sampanthan told Ambassador he agonized over the decision but ultimately had to face squarely the factthat Rajapaksa had done nothing for Tamils beyond releasingthe IDPs. When we asked him whether he feared retaliationby the Rajapaksas, Sampanthan mentioned concerns for his personal safety but said the Tamil community so far hadgotten nothing from the Rajapaksas and did not believe thepresident’s statements that he would take positive steps onreconciliation and a political solution after elections. Sampanthan also told us he hoped his announcement would notonly galvanize Tamils to vote for Fonseka but also wouldconvince others that Fonseka had a real chance of winning.While we will not know until election day whether thesehopes will be realized, indications are that a Fonsekavictory appears more possible each day. END COMMENT. ¶5. (C) The following is the full text of the Fonsekaprogram for the north and east provided to Ambassador bySampanthan. Grammatical irregularities are preserved fromthe original. BEGIN TEXT OF PROGRAM PROGRAMME OF IMMEDIATE RELIEF MEASURES FOR WAR AFFECTEDPERSONS AND AREAS FOR PEACE BY THE COMMON PRESIDENTIALCANDIDATE, SARATH FONSEKA ¶I. Restoration of Civil Administration and Normalcy ——————————————— —— ¶1. Full restoration of all institutions of CivilAdministration from the Office of Grama Sevaka upwards –free from Military, Police and Political interference. ¶2. Committees for each District headed by the respectiveDistrict Secretary (GA) and comprising:-Nominee of the President-Divisional Secretaries -Other Officials (Representatives of such Officials)-Members of Parliament/Their Representatives-Representatives of Local Authorities-Judicial Officers-Security Forces/Commanders/Officers North/East-DIG — Police /Officers-Civil Society Representatives To prepare Plan of Action for immediate implementationwithin one monthMonthly Reports on progress to be submitted to thePresident, Cabinet and Parliament. A dedicated Secretariat to be established under thePresident to monitor progress and ensure implementation. ¶3. The immediate measures stated herein to be implementedthrough Presidential Orders, including appointingPresidential Task Forces therefor. ¶4. Security Forces to be stationed at strategic locationsonly, taking into consideration national security. HighSecurity Zones to be dismantled in keeping with the COLOMBO 00000017 003.4 OF 005 re-location of the Security Forces. ¶5. Free movement of all persons to be guaranteed withoutbeing impeded by Security and Police personnel. ¶6. Police to be manned, as far as practicable, by Officerswho are conversant in Tamil. II. Prohibition of ‘para-military cadres’ and armed groups (self-styled ‘War Lords’)——————————————— ————————– ¶1. All ‘para-military cadres’ and armed groups to bedisarmed forthwith. ¶2. Areas of civilian activity to be free of weapons. ¶3. Except the Security Forces and Police, only persons withpermits under the Firearms Ordinance would be entitled topossess firearms. III. Re-settlement and rehabilitation of internallydisplaced persons ——————————————— ———————— ¶1. De-mining of areas to be speedily concluded throughDe-Mining Units. ¶2. Displaced persons to be returned to their originalhomes, and where homes have been destroyed alternativeaccommodation to be provided, with financial support toestablish themselves and develop livelihoods. ¶3. Social infrastructure requirements, such as provision of essential Foods, Medical Centers, Hospitals, Schools,Transport etc to be provided. IV. Land and Agriculture———————— ¶1. Restoration of possession of private land and buildings,now occupied by Security Forces/Police/ GovernmentAgencies, to those lawfully entitled to such land andbuildings. ¶2. Committees referred to in 1.2 above to arrange for such restoration. ¶3. Committees to submit a Scheme to the Government forpayment of compensation for damage caused to buildings. ¶4. a. Eviction of persons legitimately entitled to StateLand from such Lands; b. Other instances of deprivation oflegitimate title holders of State Lands; and c. Unlawfuloccupation of State Lands to be reviewed and the positionregularized on lawful and just basis. ¶5. Indiscriminate alienation of State Lands to beterminated. Allocations thus far made to be reviewed andcancelled, where such allocation -has not been transparent, or-lacked equal opportunity to all concerned, or -lacked proper consultation with the electedRepresentatives of the areas concerned, or-are unwarranted, or-has been on a corrupt basis. ¶6. Relief packages for full cultivation of lands. COLOMBO 00000017 004.4 OF 005 ¶7. A special law to be enacted to decide on disputes, as to ownership and succession of lands. ¶V. Fisheries———— ¶1. Full restoration of fishing rights. ¶2. Joint Committees to be set up of Representatives ofthose engaged in the fishing industry and the Navy toensure security. VI. Trade and Commerce ———————- ¶1. All barriers in respect of transport of passengers,goods, agricultural and fisheries produce to be eliminatedforthwith. ¶2. No payments (‘Kappang’) to be levied by anyone.Stringent action to be taken against those who do so. VII. Transport————– ¶1. Trains service to be restored, without delay, within theJaffna peninsula, i.e. Elephant Pass to Point Pedro. ¶2. All impediments for shipping and air transport to beremoved, with effective facilities which would ensure areduction of costs and shipping and air transport. ¶3. Establishment of a new rail line, with private sector participation, from Point Pedro to Trincomalee. VIII. Special Relief Packages —————————– ¶1. For dependents of all persons who have lost their livesduring the war, including military and police personnel,and civilians. ¶2. For persons disabled as a result of the war. IX. Persons in Detention———————— ¶1. Release of all persons in detention, within a period ofone month against whom there is no evidence, and on thebasis that such detention would not be a stigma or setbackfor their future. ¶2. Rehabilitation of those persons, who had been engaged inwar activities, on the basis of a general amnesty. ¶X. [State of Emergency] —————— As an overall measure affecting all Sri Lankans, the Stateof Emergency presently in force and the Regulations madethereunder to be terminated, since it affects the libertiesand fundamental rights of all People, in accordance with myPledges. END TEXT OF PROGRAM ¶6. (C) The following is the text of the addendum to theprogram dealing with devolution of political power.Grammatical irregularities are preserved from the original. COLOMBO 00000017 005.4 OF 005 BEGIN TEXT OF ADDENDUM Sri Lanka is an indivisible state committed both toprotecting its territorial integrity and to genuine powersharing on a basis acceptable to Sinhala, Tamil, Muslim andBurgher communities. Each unit of government will be supreme in its areas of competence. Power sharing willtake place both at the Center and the periphery. In the North-East genuine power sharing of powers of governance with executive, legislative and judicial powersover a wide array of subjects, not including nationaldefense, foreign affairs, monetary policy, national budget,elections to the Office of President and Parliament,immigration and emigration, major ports and harbours, andacceptable to the Tamil speaking peoples with adequatefinancial and fiscal powers is necessary. The North East should have Council/Councils acceptable to the Tamilspeaking peoples namely Tamils and Muslims and theSinhalese living in the East shall be established in accordance with the law. All provinces will havecompetence over land, law and order and its other areasexclusive of those areas reserved only for the Center. Appropriate institutions should be in place to secure andadvance meaningful sharing of power and the pluralisticcharacter of the State. It is accepted that the experience of the country over thelast few decades in respect of initiatives embarked upon todelineate the basic aspirations and principles in thematter of power sharing shall be drawn upon in theformulation of detailed provisions. The demarcation between the central and regional powerswill be worked out in detail between the parties on thebasis of the fundamental principles stated above.

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