Published On: Wed, Oct 12th, 2011

By eelamaran

WikiLeaks :Mahinda lies about HSZ in the Jaffna

Sri Lankan President Rajapaksa visited Jaffna on January 10, his first visit there following the end of the war. While there he made several announcements, including that the high-security zones in the Jaffna peninsula would be dismantled, leaving only what was described as a “defence front line”. Approximately 42 square kilometers in the Jaffna peninsula have been closed off as high security zones for a number of years, with some 80,000 persons displaced as a result from their homes and agricultural lands, US diplomatic cables on Wikileaks allege.

Read the full cable below;

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 000021 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INSB RELEASABLE TO: UK, CANADA, AUSTRALIA AND SWITZERLAND E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/10/2020TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF PHUM PTER EAID MOPS CESUBJECT: SRI LANKA – ELECTIONS UPDATE NO. 6

REF: A. COLOMBO 11

¶B. COLOMBO 7

¶C. COLOMBO 2

¶D. 09 COLOMBO 1152

¶E. 09 COLOMBO 1145

¶F. 09 COLOMBO 1139

COLOMBO 00000021 001.8 OF 003

Classified By: CHARGE VALERIE C. FOWLER. REASONS: 1.4 (B, D)

Fonseka’s Manifesto ——————-

¶1. (C) Presidential candidate Sarath Fonseka released his

campaign “manifesto” on January 7, a full-color 22-page

brochure, which contained a strong condemnation of President

Rajapaksa, largely on grounds of corruption and family

patronage. Post contacts have said the manifesto would be

published in all three local languages and widely

distributed. The manifesto talks about “believable change”

and contains promises on economic reform, government reform

and social welfare improvements. As detailed below,

Fonseka’s publication is rather thin on explanations of how

he intends to pay for many of the economic and social-welfare

initiatives he promises. There are a number of other

governmental reforms, however, which could be implemented

with little or no financial burden on the government.

Whether or not a victorious President Fonseka would have the

political capital needed to achieve these reforms remains to

be seen and would be dependent on a compliant parliament.

With parliamentary elections due within several months, the

exact shape of any future Fonseka-era parliament is far from

clear at present.

KEY PROMISES ————

¶2. (C) The Fonseka manifesto promises a number of

governmental reforms, which if carried out would appear to at

least begin addressing many of the major concerns held by the

international community and human rights groups.

Specifically Fonseka promises to (a) abolish the Executive

Presidency, (b) reactivate the 17th amendment to the

constitution, (c) end the culture of “white van”

disappearances and extra-judicial killings, (d) eliminate the

press council and establish an environment of free media, (e)

return all remaining IDPs and double the resettlement

allowance they receive to 100,000 rupees ) about USD$880 )

per family, (f) amend the emergency regulations, and (g) deal

with all war-related detainees by either prosecuting them,

releasing them or placing them in rehabilitation programs.

FONSEKA THE ECONOMIST? ———————-

¶3. (C) The economic portion of Fonseka’s manifesto contains

positive points on corruption and GSP plus, but more populist

positions on salaries, product prices and taxes. Fonseka

promises to appoint a powerful agency to combat fraud and

corruption, create an independent commission to audit public

finances, and pass a new Parliamentary ethics code. Fonseka

also promises to ensure that the European Union would not

revoke their GSP plus trade benefits, but without disclosing

how he would achieve this. Fonseka makes populist appeals by

promising to increase government salaries by 10,000 Rs ($88

USD) per month. Rajapaksa countered with a promise of a

2,500 Rs ($22 USD) raise. Fonseka promises to provide

pensions for agriculture and fishery workers. Fonseka plans

to reduce the fixed prices of certain items and to bring down

the price of food, diesel and kerosene and other essentials

by reducing taxes.

COLOMBO 00000021 002.8 OF 003

COST OF CORRUPTION ) THANKS TO USAID ————————————

¶4. (C) One portion of Fonseka’s argument on corruption cites

statistics from a study partially funded by a USAID grant,

entitled “Impact of Corruption on Poverty and Economic

Growth, 2007″. The manifesto does not mention the role of

USAID in that study, and it is unknown whether Fonseka

himself is aware of that connection. The report states that

loss to corruption in 2006 amounted to about 9 percent of the

2006 GDP of Sri Lanka.

HOW WILL HE PAY FOR IT? ———————–

¶5. (C ) Candidate Fonseka’s economic manifesto coincides

with the economic strategy described in reftel C. Fonseka

does not mention any real reforms except on corruption and

transparency. His promises to increase salaries, lower the

cost of living and cut taxes sound good, but he does not

provide any credible plan to accomplish these goals. In such

a heated campaign environment, it is not surprising that

Fonseka’s economic manifesto reveals more of his campaign

strategy than an economic program following the election.

WHAT ISSUES WILL DRIVE THE VOTERS? ———————————-

¶6. (C) It is unclear how many votes this manifesto will

garner. The language used in it is very professional and

nuanced, and the arguments on corruption appear convincing,

especially when coupled with other documents floating around

Sri Lanka’s e-mail network which detail the corrupt financial

dealings of the Rajapaksa family. Post is sending local

staff into the field to get a sense of the political mood

outside of Colombo and will draw from that reporting in

upcoming elections-related cables. So far voters seem

largely interested in economic matters and care much less

about security-related issues than they may have some six

months ago when the war was still fresh on everyone’s minds.

While Fonseka may be short on specific s for his economic

plan, it nonetheless is more detailed than the Rajapaksa plan

thus far, and his attacks on the cost of the Rajapaksas’

corruption may well resonate.

RAJAPAKSA IN JAFFNA “END TO HIGH-SECURITY ZONES” —————————-

¶7. (C) President Rajapaksa visited Jaffna on January 10, his

first visit there following the end of the war. While there

he made several announcements, including that the

high-security zones in the Jaffna peninsula would be

dismantled, leaving only what was described as a “defence

front line”. Approximately 42 square kilometers in the

Jaffna peninsula have been closed off as high security zones

for a number of years, with some 80,000 persons displaced as

a result from their homes and agricultural lands. It was

unclear when this would take effect, and one media outlet had

reported some IDPs had already attempted to enter one zone,

only to be turned back because the formal authorization

removing the high-security zones had not yet been received.

Sarath Fonseka had promised he would eliminate all

high-security zones if elected when he was in Jaffna

campaigning on January 2.

RAJAPAKSA PROMISES RELEASE OF SOME DETAINEES ————————–

¶8. (C) While in Jaffna, Rajapaksa told the local Catholic

COLOMBO 00000021 003.6 OF 003

Bishop that all LTTE suspects held on minor charges would be

released, pending a review of their case by the Attorney

General’s office. Local media had been reporting over the

weekend that some 700 of the ex-LTTE combatants held in

Vavuniya since the end of the war had been released. Post

contacts said by January 11 they were still waiting for a

formal court order allowing their release.

RAJAPAKSA MANIFESTO ——————-

¶9. (C) President Rajapaksa released his own manifesto

document on January 11. Post will report in more detail in

the next elections update cable once a full english

translation is obtained, but early reports are that the

document is less specific in its promises when compared with

Fonseka’s manifesto.

COMMENT: WHO WILL WIN? ———————–

¶10. (C) This election is still very much up in the air.

Polls here are very scattered and likely to be statistically

unreliable, but anecdotal evidence shows a growth in support

for Fonseka. Rajapaksa still has an enormous advantage in

his illegal use of state resources, but the idea of “change”

is becoming the issue of the day, even if Fonseka has not yet

provided specifics on how to achieve all his promises of

change. Initial contact with voters in rural areas shows a

focus on economic issues rather than security.

COMMENT: IF FONSEKA, WHAT NEXT? ——————————

¶11. (C) Some local political analysts have begun to entertain

scenarios of what might happen in the Sri Lankan government

if Fonseka did win. Early opinions say that the wide-spread

UNF coalition he has assembled had no intention of staying

together for parliamentary elections. Indeed Post local

political staff are finding that local political organizers,

in particular those from the JVP, are squirreling away

presidential campaign funds to use for their own

parliamentary campaigns. The JVP is showing its

organizational strength on the ground and is likely to

benefit in general elections. Some are saying that if

Rajapaksa loses, his family’s fortunes in the SLFP will end,

and it will revert back to its more historic form. Rumors

have cropped up in the past week that former President

Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga may announce her support

for Fonseka, with her son Vimukthi Kumaratunga at her side.

This then would serve as Vimukthi’s entrance into the

political world, and a passing of the torch to the next

generation of the Bandaranaike family, which has been deeply

involved in Sri Lankan politics for some 300 years.

Interestingly, Mangala Samaraweera, seen by many as the

brains behind Fonseka’s campaign strategy, also ran

Chandrika’s presidential campaign and was known as one of her

close confidantes. He is thought by some to be a possible

candidate for Prime Minister in a Fonseka administration

.