Sri Lanka: Managing India Helped Win War

By Krishna Pokharel

Managing international political pressure, especially from its northern neighbor India, was the key to defeating the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in May 2009, Sri Lanka has said.

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Ishara S. Kodikara/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

Sri Lankan cadets marched at a ceremony in the island’s central district town of Diyatalawa on December.

Speaking at an international seminar on “Defeating Terrorism — The Sri Lankan Experience” on Tuesday in Colombo, Sri Lanka’s Defense Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa said the “key factor underpinning the success of our operations was the management of international pressures by the political leadership.”

Mr. Rajapaksa turned to Sri Lanka’s past experience with India in dealing with the LTTE rebels. “In 1987, the enormously successful Vadamarachchi Operations had pushed the LTTE to the brink of defeat,” he said. “However, these operations could not be sustained because the Indian Government intervened,” he added.

The Vadamarachchi Operation, also known as Operation Liberation One, was the Sri Lanka Army’s military offensive against the LTTE in 1987 that aimed to drive the rebels out from the area of Vadamarachchi in the Jaffna peninsula in northern Sri Lanka.

As the Sri Lankan troops came close to annihilating the LTTE, according to Sri Lankan military accounts the operation was halted after New Delhi intervened by sending food and other provisions to ethnic Tamils who were suffering in the battle. (India has a sizable Tamil population of its own in the country’s south, many of whom sympathized with the LTTE.)

The temporary halt in the military offensive led to the signing of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord between New Delhi and Colombo in July 1987 but the accord failed in achieving its stated objective of “resolving the ethnic problem of Sri Lanka,” as critics would later observe. Under the accord, Indian troops were involved in peacekeeping operations in Sri Lanka between 1987 and 1990. The biggest fallout for India from that action was the assassination of former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi by Tamil Tigers in 1991.

Mr. Rajapaksa, the defense secretary and brother of Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa, fought for the Sri Lanka Army during the Vadamarachchi Operation.

So how was 2009 different than 1987?

“The primary problem in 1987 was that the relationship between the two countries had not been managed very effectively,” Mr. Rajapaksa said on Tuesday. “In contrast, from the time of his election [in 2005], President Rajapaksa went out of his way to keep New Delhi briefed about all the new developments taking place in Sri Lanka. He understood that while other countries could mount pressure on us through diplomatic channels or economic means, only India could influence the military campaign.”

He went on to add that “the relationship between Sri Lanka and India was managed through maintaining a clear communications line at the very highest level.”

Despite its victory over the LTTE rebels, the Sri Lankan government was severely criticized for its tactics by the international community and faces allegations of war crimes. A U.N.-appointed panel in April found that allegations of war crimes committed by the Sri Lankan troops and the Tamil Tigers during the final battles of their 27-year war are “credible.” The Sri Lankan government has denied the allegations.

Close ties with India were crucial for war victory-Gota

Wednesday, 01 June 2011 02:44

MR went out of his way to brief India

By Supun Dias

clip_image002Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa yesterday said President Mahinda Rajapaksa went out of the way to keep New Delhi briefed about all new developments taking place in Sri Lanka and continuous discussions between the two sides during the war ensured that whenever any sensitive issue arose it was resolved immediately. 

Speaking at the ‘Defeating Terrorism: the Sri Lankan Experience,’ seminar organized by the Sri Lankan Army to share its war experience, Mr. Rajapaksa said in 1987, the enormously successful Vadamarachchi Operations had pushed the LTTE to the brink of defeat and these operations could not be sustained because the Indian Government intervened. "The primary problem in 1987 was that the relationship between the two countries had not been managed effectively", he noted.

From the time of his election, President Rajapaksa went out of his way to keep New Delhi briefed about all the new developments taking place in Sri Lanka. He understood that while other countries could mount pressure on us through diplomatic channels or economic means, only India could influence the military campaign.

"From early in the military campaign, the relationship between Sri Lanka and India was managed through maintaining a clear communications line at the highest level. A special committee was established to engage in constant dialogue. The Sri Lankan side comprised then Senior Advisor to the President Basil Rajapaksa, Secretary to the President Lalith Weeratunga and myself", he added.

"The Indian side comprised former National Security Advisor M. K. Narayan, then Foreign Secretary Shiv Shankar Menon and then Defence Secretary Vijay Singh. This troika had continuous discussions and ensured that whenever any sensitive issues arose, they would be resolved immediately", he said.

Over the years, a range of different approaches including military campaigns, peace talks, and even international mediation had been tried. None had worked. With a large global financial network, highly developed offensive capabilities and no genuine interest in peace, the LTTE was a stubborn, hostile and formidable foe, he said.

PrintBy 2005, the LTTE controlled almost a quarter of the country’s territory and nearly two thirds of its coastline. Under an internationally brokered Cease Fire Agreement, the LTTE even maintained the illusion of a state apparatus in the areas under its control, he said.

He said, "By the time our military campaign resumed in 2005, the LTTE had killed more than 26,000 armed services personnel. This was no small band of militants, but a large, sophisticated military force comprising approximately 30,000 cadres, a very large arsenal of weapons and equipment, and thousands of civilians organized as auxiliary forces.

The combined strength of the Armed Forces in 2005 was nowhere near the number that was actually required for a serious campaign to eradicate the LTTE. This fact was clearly understood by the President, and the decision was made to expand the strength of the military.

There were many key factors that led to the success of the Humanitarian Operations. Perhaps the most important and critical factor was the President’s decision to expand the Armed Forces. One of the first things we realized when we studied the previous military campaigns were that the Sri Lankan military was always superior to the LTTE. 

Between the end of 2005 and the end of 2009, the Army’s 9 Divisions were increased to  20; its 44 Brigades expanded to 71 and its 149 Battalions increased to 284. This was a large, but essential expansion that increased the number of Army personnel from 120,000 in 2005 to over 200,000 by the end of the Humanitarian Operation.

http://www.dailymirror.lk/news/11680-civilians-protected-ruthless-terrorist-group.html

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Face it head on – Army Chief

Tuesday, 31 May 2011 11:14

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clip_image006By Supun Dias
Sri Lanka Army Commander Jagath Jayasuriya encouraged countries facing terrorism challenges to face it head on and said Sri Lanka experience can be used to counter them

Making the opening address on ‘Defeating Terrorism, Sri Lanka Experience,’ organized by the Sri Lankan Army to share its experience in eradicating the LTTE, the Sri Lanka Army Chief said that certain alliances are fighting against terrorism in parts of the world.
Meanwhile The Hindu reported Army Commander as saying “Victory came with many sacrifices… [this is a] saga to be shared with the world. A saga of epic political resolve… National security is no longer confined to the borders as we see in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya”.
Defence Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa speaking at the seminar said that the President went out of the way to keep New Delhi briefed about all new developments taking place in Sri Lanka during the time of the war.

He said this dialogue ensured that whenever any sensitive issues arose it was resolved immediately. 
Mr. Rajapaksa also said that in 1987, the Vadamarachchi Operations had pushed the LTTE to the brink of defeat but the operations could not be sustained because the Indian Government intervened.
“The primary problem in 1987 was that the relationship between the two countries had not been managed very effectively”, he noted.
From the time of his election, he said, President Rajapaksa went out of his way to keep New Delhi as he understood that while other countries could mount pressure on Sri Lanka through diplomatic channels or economic means, only India could influence the military campaign.

External Affairs Minister professor G.L Peiris also speaking at the event said that the International legal system has to be revamped in the context of global changes as the prevailing law deals with conflicts between two countries but whereas presently, conflicts arise within a country between the government and a non state actor.
He said that the role of the armed forces did not end after defeating terrorism. “The counter terrorist activities have to be continued”, he said.

“When thousands of civilians were trapped in the LTTE controlled areas the government launched the largest military (Imprisonment) operation) in the world to rescue them. The civilians were held at gun point and the LTTE violated the Geneva accord and our security forces rescued them. Why is no body talking about that”, Minister Peiris said.